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Abstract—Web services composition is an emerging software
development paradigm for the implementation of distributed
computing systems, the impact of which is very relevant both
in research and industry. When a complex functionality has
to be delivered on the Internet, a service integrator can pro-
duce added value by delivering more abstract and complex
services obtained by composition of existing ones. But while
isolated services availability can be improved by tuning and
reconfiguring their hosting servers, with Composed Web Ser-
vices (CWS) basic services must be taken as they are. In this
case, it is necessary to evaluate the composition effects. The
authors propose a high-level analysis methodology, supported
by a tool, based on the transformation of BPEL descriptions
of CWS into models based on the fault tree availability eval-
uation formalism that enables a modeler, unfamiliar with the
underlying combinatorial probabilistic mathematics, to evalu-
ate the availability of CWS, given components availability and
expected execution behavior.
Keywords—automatic model generation, Composed Web Ser-
vices, fault tree, model composition, service availability.
1. Introduction
Quantitative evaluation of characteristics of distributed
systems is a difficult task, due to the complexity of the
systems and to the need for efficient models evaluation. In
many fields, classical mathematical evaluation frameworks
have been structured into higher level methods that hide the
complexity of the mathematical approach by encapsulating
it into graphical (or other kinds of) formalisms, easier to
manage, with the aim of enabling the use by non-expert
users.
Two classical examples of such high level methods are
given by Fault Trees and Stochastic Petri Nets. Fault
Trees1 (FT) is a graphical formalism to model the com-
bined probability of a complex event (called fault, since the
technique is typical in reliability/availability engineering),
given the interrelation of (statistically independent) basic
events, that are characterized by a known (fault) probabil-
ity, specified by a number of intermediate events that result
by elementary conjunctions or disjunction of basic events.
Such a high-level method allows an expert in system engi-
neering to exploit the benefits of probability computation
in large systems, without the need for explicit knowledge
in the field and with the additional benefit that, whatever
1Fault Trees can also be used for a qualitative analysis of the relevance
of the role of basic events with respect to the complex event.
the model complexity, the modeling process is less error-
prone than writing the actual equations and scales better.
Stochastic Petri Nets (SPN) [1] is a graphical formalism
to model the dynamic behavior of concurrent systems that
can be evaluated by Markov chains. In SPN the system is
modeled by places, characterized by a marking in terms of
tokens that represent a part of the system state, and transi-
tions that modify the markings of the places to which they
are connected according to exponentially distributed firing
rates. Such a method allows a modeler that has a very good
knowledge about the system to represent and evaluate it by
Markov chains without the need for being familiar with
them. Analogously, other methods can be found in litera-
ture enabling different ways the use of complex mathemat-
ical tools while hiding their details behind a user-friendly
framework.
The stratification and the articulation of modern distributed
systems, that are built after a system-of-systems logic, pose
a second level complexity problem, that consists in mod-
eling such systems by aggregating (sub-)models in order
to cope with the explosion of their extension by exploiting
the same compositional logic. The availability of higher
level methods is not sufficient to enable efficient model-
ing processes, so additional conceptual tools are needed
to supply proper approaches that can scale to more com-
plex and extended system architectures. In this paper we
propose a structured approach for the construction of high
level probabilistic availability models (based on exponen-
tially distributed variables) for a very common and spread
class of distributed systems, such as Service Oriented Ar-
chitecture (SOA) compliant systems, that are based on the
Service Oriented Computing (SOC) paradigm.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief
introduction to FT and their evaluation; Section 3 intro-
duces the SOA and related problems. Section 4 introduces
service composition; Section 5 shows the general approach
to obtain availability models from BPEL (Business Process
Execution Language) documents and is complemented by
the description of supporting tool and an example in Sec-
tion 6 and Section 7. Final considerations and future works
complete the paper.
2. Fault Trees
FT is based on the idea that independent undesired events
influence the general behavior of a complex system accord-
ing to its structure. Events effects combinations are repre-
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sented by two operations, analogous to OR and AND op-
erators of Boolean algebra and logic networks. Two events
are combined by an OR operator if each of their single in-
dividual contributions is effective on the system, while they
are combined by an AND if their contribution is effective
only if they happen both at the same time.
Let A1 . . . An, n ∈ N be n events, statistically indepen-
dent and with probabilities P1 = P(A1) . . . Pn = P(An),
Pi << 1∀i ∈ 1 . . . n (due to the nature of the application
field). From a quantitative point of view, the probability P
of the event A = Ai OR A j, i, j ∈ 1 . . . n, i 6= j, represents the
probability of the case in which Ai or Ai happens, eventu-
ally simultaneously with the other. Such a probability can
be computed as Pi +PjPi j, in which Pi j is the probability of
having Ai and A j simultaneously. If Ai and A j are mutually
exclusive, Pi j = 0, but generally, being Ai and A j indepen-
dent and Pi,Pi << 1,Pi j << Pi + Pj and P ≈ Pi + Pj (rare
events approximation). The probability of the event A = Ai
AND A j, i, j ∈ 1 . . . n, i 6= j, represents the probability of
the case in which Ai and A j happen simultaneously. Such
a probability can be computed as Pi ·Pj, being Ai and A j
independent.
Both operators can be generalized to any number of
operands. The reader will find the analysis of the gen-
eralized AND and OR operations and a more thorough in-
troduction to FT in [2]. For the goals of this paper, it is
sufficient to consider that, in the given hypotheses, by prop-
erly using the operators to aggregate together basic (and/or
non basic) events to obtain non-basic events it is possible to
form the different levels of a FT, until a single event (top
event) is described as complex event aggregation. Given
a complete FT, the analysis of its structure gives the ana-
lytical expression of the probability of the top event that can
be easily obtained by mechanical substitutions whatever the
complexity of the tree.
The possibility or representing as logical operations the
combination of events allows for the application of boolean
algebra to fault trees. Given a FT, it can be described in
terms of a Boolean equation that can be transformed apply-
ing the theorems of Boolean algebra. Such transformation
can result into a reduction of the model, or can be ex-
ploited, as in the following, to extend the use of FT to in-
clude fictitious events that enable for the expression of more
complicated conditions. Besides AND and OR, Boolean
algebra defines the NOT operator, that is not present in
the description given in this section for FT. The interpre-
tation of the NOT operator applied to an event (A, with
probability P) results in the definition of the complemen-
tary event (A′, with probability 1−P), that can be used
in the FT.
3. Service Oriented Computing
The Service Oriented Computing paradigm provides
a methodological foundation for the design of complex dis-
tributed applications by integrating existing components,
namely services.
A service is a software component capable of interacting
with other services with a loose coupling logic to provide a
functionality that is performed by it in complete autonomy.
A service is accessible independently from its implemen-
tation details and is designed to be reused. Services are
commonly implemented by Web service technology that
allows services to be discovered, integrated and used on
the Internet, by running them on a server (that can run
simultaneously more Web services).
Services are meant to be integrated, knowing their inter-
faces, in Business Processes (BP) or Workflows (WF).
Among the several techniques available for such integra-
tion, BPEL [3] is the most spread solution and took the
role of standard language for services orchestration. Or-
chestration is one of the two main strategies for service
integration and is based on the idea that an application
consists in a centrally specified BP or WF that operates all
services involved and is run by a specific executor.
BPEL is a language for the specification of orchestrations,
based on Extensible Markup Language (XML). A BPEL
document can be assumed as the formal description of the
desired service orchestration. The integration of services by
a service integrator can produce a significant added value if
the composed, more abstract, complex service is designed
to provide a well defined Quality of Service (QoS), even-
tually better than the one offered by isolated services. Iso-
lated services can be fine-tuned by reconfiguring their host-
ing servers to increase performances or availability, but in
the case of Composed Web Services (CWS) basic services
have to be taken as they are. In this case a reasonable
measure is to evaluate the effects of the composition. In
order to perform such evaluation, a quantitative analysis is
needed. In the next section an analysis methodology that al-
lows availability evaluation of CWS by transforming BPEL
descriptions into FT models exploiting proper patterns is
proposed.
BPEL definition of a CWS intrinsically describes the rela-
tions by which the availability of component basic services
influences the availability of the composed one. System-
atic analysis of BPEL language elements allows the defini-
tion of equivalent FT patterns that represent their compo-
sition effects. With this premises, it is possible to obtain
an evaluation method for the availability of a CWS given
components availability and the expected execution CWS
behavior. Such an approach offers a decision support tool
for integrators.
Literature shows a great interest in formal verification of
BPEL programs, mainly oriented to correctness verifica-
tion. The most spread approaches are based on high-level
analysis methods (both for quantitative and qualitative eval-
uation) to ease the understanding of such systems. An im-
portant contribution is provided by van der Aalst’s transfor-
mations from BPEL to Petri Nets (PN) to perform liveness
verification [4]–[6]. Studies of non-functional properties of
BPEL WFs [7]–[10] by means of formal models are mainly
oriented to performance and security rather than reliability
and availability. The use of FT for reliability and avail-
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ability models generation is consolidated [11]–[15]. In FT
models have been generated from system descriptions while
in a UML system model is used for automatic generation
of Dynamic FT.
Recent research trends explore the applications of these
techniques to the wider topic of the cloud computing. Some
scientific works related to this aspect are [16]–[19].
4. Proposed Approach
Following literature general orientation, a high-level mod-
eling approach to the stated availability modeling problem
has been chosen, founded onto Fault Trees as a basic high-
level probabilistic tool. According to this choice, the low-
level mathematical details (related to FT) will not be con-
sidered in the following and the work will focus on high-
level transformations and compositions.
The main aim of this paper is the definition of a relation-
ship between BPEL language constructs and fault tree pat-
terns. CWS availability must be assured in order to provide
a sustainable level of QoS. A failure is an event that occurs
when the delivered service deviates from correct service in
value or time [20]. In this paper a CWS failing is consid-
ered if it does not reply at all to requests (delays are not
relevant).
The authors apply model-driven techniques to generate for-
mal models of critical services. In particular model-to-
model transformations are applied in order to automate the
generation of availability models of CWS. The composi-
tional approach that will be used is supported by the main
results of compositional failure analysis [21], [22], accord-
ing to which system failure models can be constructed from
component failure models using a process of composition,
For a further introduction to automated safety analysis and
reuse the reader can refer to [23].
The main problem in evaluating CWS availability is due to
distribution and heterogeneity. Assumed the CWSs as bug-
free software components, here we only consider faults due
to their distributed nature and the dependence of provided
service from requested ones, i.e. hosting hardware, mes-
sages delivery, timeout, network faults. Thus, faults mainly
come from invoked services that run on remote servers.
These faults can be reasonably represented by stochastic
models. Assuming that remote services can fail and local
ones generally cannot, not every fault occurrence brings
CWS to a failure since BPEL can mask faults by means
of Fault Handlers (FHs) and offers choice constructs. The
effective contributions of faults to CWS availability are de-
termined by the WF business logic, that describes the in-
vocation patterns, and by its workload profile (that gives
e.g. the estimated branching probability in a choice or av-
erage number of activations in a loop). Note that while for
components embedded in a system nature and frequency of
their failures are known or at least estimable, components
of a CWS are remote services that cannot be examined or
stress tested, since they do not belong to the same organi-
zation. Anyway, a coarse grain stochastic model of remote
service failures can be obtained by logs or tests combined
with QoS parameters declared by the providers.
In the following the authors propose FT patterns for some
BPEL elements. Since this set is not complete the proposed
approach must be considered an ongoing work. FTs have
been chosen because of their handiness and because more
complex modeling tools (multi-state variables, complex re-
pair mechanisms and dynamic issues) are not needed at
the state. For each of these constructs, the authors analyze
with a top-down perspective how faults of inner activities
propagate to construct failures.
Sequence is the simplest BPEL structured activity, and rep-
resents the execution of a temporally ordered sequence of
activities, each of which is started only if and when the pre-
vious one is completed. A Sequence fails if at least one of
the (remote) activities fails. Assuming a Sequence of A and
B activities, Fig. 1a depicts the corresponding FT model.
In this model A and B are characterized by their unavail-
ability. It is important to stress that A and B are depicted as
generic middle events since they can be recursively trans-
lated by another pattern. Moreover some of them can also
be local activities and can be considered impossible events
(unavailability equal to 0). Fig. 1b defines the translation of
If construct, that branches the execution into two mutually
exclusive activities (one of which can be an empty activity)
according to a Boolean condition. As activities in then and
else branches are mutually exclusive it can be stated that
a failure of the If is possible if A fails when A is activated
(events that occurs with probability pTH) or B fails when
the else branch is chosen (event that occurs with probabil-
ity pELSE = 1− pTH). The translation is obtained by the
introduction of two virtual events pTH and pELSE, that
account for these considerations. Figure 1c introduces the
FT pattern for Fault handler construct, that executes an ac-
tivity if the related construct fails. As the whole construct
fails if both the handled activity S and the catch process
(Catch) fail, the best way to translate it into FT is a subtree
with an AND gate between the fault events. Figure 1d de-
picts behavior of BPEL loops (Foreach, While), that repeat
a certain activity a given number of times or until a certain
condition is satisfied, from the point of view of unavail-
ability. Assuming a loop of an activity S, if we evaluate
(from CWS workload profile estimation) the mean number
of times the loop is called, loop fails if at least one of
these calls fails2. BPEL Flow describes the parallel con-
current execution of a certain number of activities. A Flow
of 1 . . . n fails in the same way as loops, so Fig. 1e rep-
resents its FT pattern. The Link construct needs a deeper
discussion. When a link is present in a flow construct,
two activities are involved: a link source and a link target.
The execution of the target activity depends on the termina-
tion condition of the source activity. While source activity
failure modes are not affected by this construct, target activ-
ity execution may change according to ingoing links status
and several conditions that characterize its behavior. Due
2This can be written under hypothesis of independence of invoked ser-
vice.
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SEQ
A
A
B
B
IF
Then Else
pTH pELSE
FH
S Catch
Loop
S S....
n
Flow
S1 Sn....
TARG
f(SJF)
JC T
g(JC)
L1 LN
(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e) (f)
Fig. 1. Fault Tree patterns of relevant BPEL constructs.
to these reasons a different FT pattern must be used. It
represents the translation of activity in flows (T ) that are
target of one or more links (see Fig. 1f). The parameters
that influence WF control flow and that directly affect the
nature of f and g functions in Fig. 1f, are: joinCondition
(JC) (a logic predicate based on link conditions 1 . . . n; as
this predicate can evaluate to true, target activity is allowed
to start) and suppressJoinFailure (SJF) (when this flag is
true, a failure on joinCondition is suppressed, target activ-
ity does not start and the fault does not propagate through
WF control flow). Otherwise, the target activity may fail
on joinCondition failure or on an inner failure.
Such considerations can be summarized into the following
equation (also see Table 1):
TARG = SJF ·T · JC+!SJF · (T+!JC) ,
where ! is the NOT operator, · is the AND operator, + is
the OR operator, and where SJF is the suppressJoinFailure
flag, JC is the truth of joinCondition and T is the fault
event of target activity.
According to such equation, we can state that:
• if suppressJoinFailure is true, failure of link target
can be written as the conjunction of the failure of
activity and the success of joinCondition so f is
an AND gate while g implements the joinCondition
logic predicate,
• if suppressJoinFailure is false, failure of this link tar-
get can be written as the disjunction of the failure
of activity and the failure of joinCondition so f is
an OR gate while g implements the negation of join-
Condition logic predicate.
Table 1
Truth table for link target activity
Link Target SJF JC T
0 0 0 0
1 0 0 1
1 0 1 0
1 0 1 1
0 1 0 0
1 1 0 1
0 1 1 1
In next sections these patterns are applied to evaluate and
compare two example CWS.
5. Support Tools
To support the proposed methodology a tool for the au-
tomatic translation of a BPEL file into an analyzable FT
has been developed. Moreover the tool takes into account
some information that can not be specified into the BPEL
file (e.g., probability of then-else branches in if constructs,
failure rates of Invoke activities). These data are passed to
the tool by a simple properties file. The steps implemented
by the tool are depicted in Fig. 2. The tool has been devel-
oped in Java and relies on SHARPE [24] for the analysis
of generated fault tree.
This is the workflow of the tool in presence of simple ser-
vices, i.e., where there is one single Web service. In pres-
ence of more services, during the phase of properties file
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Parse BPEL
file SPEL
Properties
Results
Generate BPEL
constructs tree
Read property file
Create links
on BPEL nodes
Simply tree
Generate FT
by patterns
Translate into
analysis format
Analyse and
retrieve results
Fig. 2. Tool processing steps.
reading the BPEL constructs tree is explored. Its leaves,
that are Invokes constructs, are searched in properties file.
In case of an Invoke that is related to another BPEL im-
plemented Web service, the entire analysis process is re-
cursively repeated generating a series of Fault Trees hier-
archically organized. Moreover, during the analysis phase,
Fault Trees are solved from bottom to up in order to exploit
modular analysis of such models.
6. Case Study
In this section proposed FT patterns to the evaluation of
availability of a BPEL example WF is applied. The chosen
case study is an agri-food information and tracking sys-
tem. Agri-food information and tracking systems require
that information about goods is registered and verified for
every item that is produced or transformed in the market.
Moreover data vaults are needed in order to store historical
data about several aspects of goods, i.e., origin, storage,
transportation, composition, processing data. Such regis-
tration has to be certified by third parties, eventually au-
thorized and supervised by public authority if requested by
the law.
The system to be analyzed requests the registration and
logs every request attempt and confirmation on a central-
ized logging system that is shared with all other dedicated
information systems of the same company. The structure
of the system is shown in Fig. 3a. The system is com-
posed by a CWS that executes the described orchestra-
tion and two subsystems, Log (based on two remote log-
ging services) and Reg (based on three remote registries).
Figure 3b describes the high-level message flow performed
by the system. The CWS uses the subsystems by request-
ing a logging operation (Pre with PAck response), the reg-
istration (Save with a SAck response) and another logging
operation (End with PEnd response).
CWS
CWSReg Reg
Reg
A
B
C
Log
Log
L1 L2 L3
Pre
PAck
SAck
Save
End
EAck
(a) (b)
Fig. 3. UML description of case study.
The CWS BPEL implementation can be represented as
in Fig. 4.
receive:ReceiveInput
invoke:Log
invoke:Log
invoke:Reg
reply:CallbackClient
Fig. 4. CWS BPEL implementation.
The Reg subsystem is implemented by another CWS that
uses 3 external (geographically distributed) certification ser-
vices in parallel. Requests to services are cached locally to
minimize accesses, and are then performed when the cache
is full. Information about the requests that are ready to be
sent, cached or processed, are checked and the calculated
checksum is logged. Requests arrive in batches of 5 and it
is tolerated 1 processing problem per batch.
Processing of batches is implemented by a BPEL Foreach.
For each item, the local WS managing the cache is in-
voked to evaluate if the request can be cached (and just
the logging has to be performed) or data has to be sent to
registries (in this case, by invoking local services results of
registration operations are validated, operations are logged
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and the cache is reset). The interaction with the registries
is executed by a BPEL flow.
To show the effectiveness of the approach, two versions of
the CWS are presented and examined, with slight differ-
ences. The two variants are depicted in Fig. 5 (a simple
version) and in Fig. 6 (the fault tolerant version).
invoke:A invoke:B invoke:C
receive:ReceiveInput
invoke:askCache
foreach:OnEachRequest
if:cacheHit
else:miss
flow:Flow
then:hit
invoke:resCalc
invoke:voting
invoke:resCalc
invoke:cacheUpd
reply:CallbackClient
Fig. 5. Simple version of REG service.
invoke:A invoke:B invoke:C
receive:ReceiveInput
invoke:askCache
foreach:OnEachRequest
if:cacheHit
else:miss
flow:Flow
then:hit
invoke:resCalc
fh:Cfh:Bfh:A
empty:EA empty:EB empty:EC
empty:Guard
invoke:voting
invoke:resCalc
invoke:cacheUpd
reply:CallbackClient
Fig. 6. Fault tolerant version of REG service.
In the first, a fault in one of the service invocations causes
a fault of the Flow activity and of the CWS. The second
one is designed to complete successfully if at least one of
the parallel invocations is successful3 and join failures are
not suppressed4. To obtain the same final result, in this im-
plementation failed registrations are externally rescheduled
as off-line background operations by the Fault Handlers, if
at least one external registry recorded the information so
that it becomes public and official.
The second version of the CWS is clearly designed to obtain
an improvement in the availability of the system, due to the
introduction of fault tolerance in the registration. But how
much more available is the second version?
In order to analyze availability of the two implementa-
tions, only relevant (fault prone) constructs are to be con-
sidered. The resulting FTs differ in the branch that rep-
resents the Flow construct, and are represented in Fig. 7.
The askCache, resCalc, voting and cacheUpd activities are
considered to be fault prone. The three remote invocations
(namely A, B and C) are obviously fault prone. The com-
mon part of the FT is in Fig. 7a. In the first case, the
availability of the Flow depends on the availability of A, B
and C as in Fig. 7b. In the second case, by simply applying
the patterns Fig. 7c is obtained. Anyway, some consider-
ations are useful to obtain the solution in Fig. 7d, that is
the correct solution. At first, Guard is not fault prone and
contributes with a null fault probability to the composition,
and A, B and C do not give contribution because of the
presence of their Fault Handlers. Moreover a Link Lx is
true when the related Invoke X is successful, so the proba-
bility of the event NOT(Lx is true) is the fault probability of
X and NOT(OR(La,Lb,Lc)) = AND(A,B,C), that is finally
the only contribution of the Flow to the FT.
According to considerations previously made, we assume
that: service failure rates are 10−7h−1 for askToCache,
resCalc, cacheUpdate and CallbackClient, 10−2h−1 for A
and B, 5 · 10−3h−1 for C, 10−6h−1 for voting. The au-
thors are also assuming that the probability of execution
of the hit then branch is 0.3. With these parameters, the
two variants have a CWS MTTF of 1978000 and 2017400
hours. FT models have been evaluated by the SHARPE
tool [24]. The Log subsystem is implemented by a third
CWS that uses 2 external (geographically distributed) log-
ging services in parallel. The two services are run by the
company, but in a remote data center. They are config-
3This is obtained inserting three Empty activities in sequence with the
three invocations and a fourth Empty activity, that is the destination of
three Links originating in the three Invoke activities, true if the Invoke was
successful. This activity is executed if the logical OR of the three Links
is true. Another solution without the three Empty activities is possible,
but due to ambiguities in the standard it could be not correctly supported
by all BPEL interpreters. Here sequences are used to ensure that outgoing
Links are set to false in case of faults.
4Faults generated by an Invoke activity are masked by a Fault Handler
to prevent the propagation to the Flow activity, so that it, and eventually
the CWS, will fail only if none of the three parallel Invoke activities is
successful. Moreover Links from invoked services and a central consensus
activity has been introduced in order to evaluate failures of one or more
remote activities.
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On each request
KooN
1....N
Cache hit
Ask to cache
Then Else
pTH SEQ pELSE RES CALC
RES CALCFlow
Flow
Flow
Flow
Voting Cache UPD
A
A
A
B
B
B
C
C
C JCGUARD
GUARDJC
NOT(JC)
La Lb Lc
(a)
(b) (c)
(d)
Fig. 7. Generated Fault Trees of CWSs
ured as mirrors and store the same information. Requests
to services are implemented by a BPEL flow. Two ver-
sions of the CWS are presented: the first requires both the
registrations to be successful in order to have a successful
completion of the Log CWS (Fig. 8). The second is suc-
cessful if at least one of the two registrations is successful,
as a BPEL Fault Handler instructs the failed mirror to au-
tomatically retry the registration according to the other as
receive:ReceiveInput
flow:Flow
invoke:L1 invoke:L2
reply:CallbackClient
Fig. 8. Simple version of Log service.
soon as possible (Fig. 9).
receive:ReceiveInput
flow:Flow
invoke:L1 invoke:L2
reply:CallbackClient
fh:L1 fh:L2
empty:EL1 empty:EL2
empty:Guard
Fig. 9. Fault tolerant version of Log service.
The structure of the two alternative implementations is sim-
ilar to that of the cases seen for the Reg subsystem, so no
further comment will be given here.
Given the compositionality of the approach, the main CWS
availability can be obtained using the results of the analyses
performed on the other CWS. Four cases can be obtained
by combining the two alternative implementations for each
subsystem. The general FT for the CWS can be obtained
by considering that two subsequent invocations of the Log
CWS are completely independent, since they are enclosed
in a BPEL Sequence. According to the related pattern, the
CWS FT is described in Fig. 10. The complete FTs for the
four cases are omitted.
CWS
Log Reg Log
Fig. 10. Fault tolerant version of Log service.
The parameters used in our analysis are summarized in
Table 2. Numerical values are failure rates and are ex-
pressed in h−1.
According to such parameters, Table 3 describes the overall
availability (MTTF) of composed Web service according
to the four different configurations of Reg (on rows) and
Log (on columns) services.
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Table 2
Processes parameters
Parameter Value
Reg service
askToCache 10−7
hit 0.8
resCalc 10−5
remoteA 5 ·10−4
remoteB 5 ·10−4
remoteC 5 ·10−4
voting 10−9
cacheUpd 10−7
callbackClient 10−8
Log service
Log1 10−7
Log2 10−7
callbackClient 10−8
Table 3
MTTF overall analysis
Log Reg Simple [h] Fault tolerant [h]
Simple 829530 1241500
Fault tolerant 836400 1256900
One can note that, since the Log process is called twice
in the overall process, its influence is stronger so passing
from a simple to a complex implementation of this process
has a great effect on overall availability. On the other hand
the adoption effect of fault tolerant version of Reg pro-
cess does not give a great advance on overall availability.
Such considerations are now not only intuitive and based
on qualitative consideration but, by means of the described
methodology and tool, can be supported by numerical data.
7. Conclusions and Future Works
In this paper a first step in the translation of a BPEL WF
into a formal model in order to evaluate its availability is
proposed. For this purpose a FT model is generated having
as basic events invoked services whose availability can be
measured by black box approaches. The structure of the
FT is given by the BPEL WF by applying FT patterns.
The effectiveness of proposed approach has been shown by
evaluating and comparing, by means of a tool prototype
that supports the translation, the availability of two similar
BPEL examples, one of which introduces fault masking
constructs.
Next steps in this activity will include a further validation
of proposed approach by experiments and/or comparisons
with models obtained by other formal tools (e.g. General-
ized Stochastic Petri Nets). On the other side the authors
will study the possibility to include quantitative informa-
tion, provided at the moment in a separate file, into BPEL,
proposing some extension of the language and providing
supporting methodologies and tools.
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